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There is a better model for Ireland than Iceland ... People should be looking at
Kazakhstan, which didnt bail out any creditors and let the three biggest banks
fail, yet avoided a recession by letting the currency plunge and using monetary
stimulus...
The Telegraph, 8 December 2010
1 Introduction
The recent global nancial crisis has resulted in banking crises in a range of countries. As
a share of total bank system assets, the biggest bank failures during the rst phase of the
nancial crisis in 2008=09 were in Iceland (circa 90%) followed by Belgium (53%), Kazakhstan
(28%) and the UK (26%) (Laeven and Valencia, 2010). During the nancial crisis, the capital
of the entire Kazakh banking sector was negative because of the large negative equity of two of
the countrys largest banks (BTA and Alliance). Because both banks were considered too-big-
to-fail the government decided to nationalize them but having done so it turned out they were
too-big-to-save and the government declared that it would not guarantee the foreign liabilities
of any banks. Consequently, BTA and Alliance defaulted on their foreign liabilities.
The recent turmoil in the banking sector has focused attention on banking performance
and, in particular, on the quality of bank assets and credit risk. Many studies of banking
performance have attempted to estimate the e¤ect of loan quality and risk on banking e¢ ciency
and productivity. The earlier studies analyze the e¤ect of loan quality and banking risk on
the e¢ ciency of U.S. banks (e.g. Mester, 1996, and Berger and Mester, 1997). In general,
these studies observe a negative relationship between problem loans and banking e¢ ciency.
This relationship, however, may be a phenomenon that relates to periods of bad luck, bad
management, skimpingand moral hazard (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). More recent studies
investigate the risk-performance nexus for European banks. This literature is wide ranging and
includes cross country studies (e.g. Iannotta et al., 2007) and studies of banking e¢ ciency in
Greece (Pasiouras, 2008), Japan (Altunbas et al., 2000), emerging economies (Isik and Hassan,
2002), East Asian countries (Sun and Chang, 2011, Kwan, 2003, and Chiu and Chen, 2009)
and transition countries (Havrylchyk, 2006, Kenjegalieva et al., 2009, Kraft and Tirtiroglu,
1998 and Brissimis et al., 2008).
Using rich monthly data for virtually the entire Kazakh banking industry for a study period
(March 2007 December 2010) which includes the nancial crisis, we draw on the nancial
intermediation approach to apply Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to t several functions
(cost, revenue, standard prot, alternative prot and input distance). The tted functions
are used to investigate the e¤ect of the quality and risk of the loan portfolio on the industry
best practice frontiers, and the economic and technical ine¢ ciencies of individual banks, whilst
controlling for other bank specic characteristics. Since the study period includes the nancial
crisis we pay particular attention to the performance of BTA and Alliance.
This paper contributes to the banking literature in four ways. Firstly, whereas most banking
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studies use the overall level of problem loans and/or provisions for loan losses as proxies for
banking risk, we use data which classies loans into seven categories according to their quality
and riskiness. Specically, two classications are used. The rst is based on the volume of loans
and the second is based on the level of provision for loan losses. Both classications split the
bank loan portfolio into standard, bad and doubtful loans with a further ve sub-categories of
the latter. We observe some interesting di¤erences between the e¤ects of the two classications
on the industry best practice frontiers and banking ine¢ ciencies. These di¤erences are likely
to be because the loan loss provisions classication will reect not only issuance behavior but
also managerial discretion on loan reserves to manipulate prot. For this reason we posit that
the volume of bad loans as a share of total assets, rather than the ratio of reserves on bad loans
to total assets, should be used to monitor the level of non-performing loans in the Kazakh
banking sector, which is still a big issue for the industry despite some improvement in this area
since the height of the nancial crisis.
Secondly, our approach is similar to Hughes and Mester (1993) and Berger and Mester
(1997) but whereas they estimate cost and prot functions to analyze the e¤ect of risk on
the industry best practice frontiers and bank ine¢ ciencies, we t a further three functions.
In addition, here the modeling of the best practice frontiers takes into account inter-bank
heteroscedasticity in ine¢ ciency e¤ects and unobservable heterogeneity in the bankstechnolo-
gies. Thirdly, to the best of the authorsknowledge this is the rst study to analyze banking
performance in Kazakhstan. It is the largest landlocked country, has substantial oil reserves
and in the early 2000s it was one of the fastest growing economies in the world with growth
comparable to the East Asian tigers.1
Fourthly, the determinants of the industry best practice frontiers and banking ine¢ ciencies
are used to inform a discussion of the characteristics of Kazakh bank behavior during the recent
nancial crisis. We nd that an increase in the volume of bad loans as a ratio of total lending
has a desirable e¤ect on the cost, input-distance and alternative prot frontiers, all of which is
consistent with the skimpinghypothesis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
banking sector developments in Kazakhstan and in Section 3 we set out the empirical method-
ology. Section 4 describes the data set and in section 5 the empirical results are presented and
analyzed. In section 6, we conclude by suggesting how the empirical ndings can be used to
assist in acting on the lessons that have been learnt from the Kazakh banking crisis.
1In the extant literature Kazakh banks have featured in a number of cross country studies on the a¤ect of
nancial development on banking e¢ ciency (e.g. Turk Ariss, 2010; De Haas et al., 2010; Fries and Taci, 2005).
The rst of these studies analyses banking e¢ ciency across 60 countries whereas the latter study uses a sample
of banks in 15 countries. These studies provide a regional picture of bank e¢ ciency although it is debatable if it
makes sense to compare the ndings of such studies because often the samples are very di¤erent. Interestingly,
in the latter study, on average, Kazakh banks are the most e¢ cient in the sample. This nding provides further
motivation for an e¢ ciency analysis which focuses exclusively on Kazakh banks.
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2 Kazakh Banking Sector Development
Amodern banking system typically has a decentralized two-tier structure with second-tier com-
mercial banks that are independent of the upper-tier central bank. In 1987, several years prior
to the collapse of Soviet Union, the Soviet government formally reorganized the monobank
into a two-tier banking system. The State Bank (Gosbank) acted as the central bank. The
second tier consisted of specialized commercial banks which were responsible for providing
nancial services to state-owned enterprises. Many branches of the quasi-independent com-
mercial banks severed ties with their parent bank and formed autonomous banking units. In
addition, privately-owned banks and nancial institutions were allowed to enter the industry.
This resulted in a rapid increase in the number of registered commercial banks.
In 1991, Kazakhstan inherited this quasi two-tier banking system with 72 second-tier banks.
In 1993, Kazakhstan left the ruble area and introduced its own currency (Kazakh tenge, KZT).
In the same year the Gosbank was reorganized and the Kazakh central bank, the National Bank
of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NBK), was formed. Initially, as is the case in most transition
countries, the new central bank had quite liberal licensing policies which in conjunction with
shortcomings in the legal framework and the supervisory system fostered further growth in the
number of undercapitalized and potentially nonviable banks. By 1994 the number of banks
had peaked at 191. This rapid growth of the banking system, however, did not result in an
increase in nancial intermediation and competition. Hoelscher (1998) posits that there are
four reasons for this: (i) in some parts of the country banking was highly concentrated; (ii)
there were established working relationships between some banks so competition was not likely
to materialize between these banks; (iii) the formation of nancial-industrial groups deterred
entry; (iv) some banks were set up not to compete but for other reasons e.g. to obtain subsidized
credit from the NBK.
In the 1990s Kazakhstan experienced severe macroeconomic and nancial instability. GDP
fell by over 25% over the period 1992 94 and in 1994 ination was 1; 160%. Also, private sector
condence in the banking sector dissipated rapidly. This is evident because the deposit base as
a share of GDP fell from 72% in 1994 to less than 5% in 1996. This coincided with the NBK
presiding over a series of reforms of the banking and nancial system. The reforms included,
the introduction of liquidation proceedings which enabled NBK to initiate the liquidation of
failing banks. Banking supervision was also tightened and involved more comprehensive on-site
inspections, tighter licensing agreements and stricter capital requirements. This resulted in an
increase in license withdrawals and a marked fall in the number of new bank registrations.
This is borne out by the sharp fall in the number of banks over the period 1995   2005 (see
Table 1). In 1994 non-performing loans accounted for over 50% of the systems loan portfolio.
In light of this a big part of the reforms involved transferring non-performing loans from banks
to three debt resolution companies (the Rehabilitation Bank, RB, the Agricultural Support
Fund, ASF, and Exim Bank) which were set up by the NBK (IMF, 1998).
[Insert Table 1]
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Strong economic growth from 2000   2007 (over 10% for some years during this period),
which was largely due to growth of the oil sector, fuelled condence in many sectors of the
Kazakh economy. The rapid growth of the Kazakh economy was accompanied by an increase
in the capacity of the Kazakh banking system. Financial deepening also increased sharply in
Kazakhstan and was well above the levels in most of the former Soviet Union countries and
was only slightly below the levels in the EU accession countries (IMF, 2005). To illustrate, the
lending of commercial banks as a share of GDP increased from 7% in 1999 to 67% in 2007 and
over the same period, the ratio of deposits to GDP increased from 8% to 48%.
Although the credit boom in Kazakhstan was accompanied by an increase in the deposit
base, the base was not strong. This is because the growing condence in the Kazakh banking
system and the gradual depreciation of the tenge since 2000 created a strong preference for
foreign currency. Moreover, since the demand for credit was growing faster than domestic sav-
ings some Kazakh banks, which were rated by international rating agencies, borrowed heavily
in international markets at competitive rates to nance mortgages, consumer loans, loans for
real estate construction and loans to facilitate international trade. Consequently, the ratio of
foreign currency lending to total lending was high. For example, only 10% of mortgage loans in
2004 were issued in the domestic currency (IMF, 2005). Because of the availability of foreign
currency at relatively cheap rates some Kazakh banks increased their holdings of real estate,
investments and nancial assets abroad. By 2007 the banking sectors external debt was 43:2%
of GDP (Barisitz and Lahnsteiner, 2010). In addition, by the end of 2006 o¤-balance sheet
items had grown to over three-quarters of the banking systems balance sheet assets. Despite
strong economic growth in Kazakhstan, the reliance of the banking system on external nance
represented a substantial risk which ultimately proved to be excessive.
The sustained credit expansion in Kazakhstan was followed by a severe credit collapse in
late 2007. The collapse was severe because the credit bubble had grown so big. Typically
a credit bubble in an emerging market is preceded by a credit boom lasting about 3:5 years
(IMF, 2004). In the case of Kazakhstan the credit boom lasted longer than is typically the
case which fuelled the growth of the credit bubble. The Kazakh credit crisis was primarily
due to moral hazard problems in the Kazakh banking sector because too many risky loans, in
particular mortgages, were issued in the credit boom. The U.S. subprime and global nancial
crises made foreign investors more risk averse, there was large scale deleveraging by foreign
investors and there was a shift away from investing in real estate, all of which exacerbated the
problems in the Kazakh banking sector. This is because Kazakh banks were heavily dependent
on external nance and a large share of Kazakh banks loan portfolios were nancing real
estate projects. Kazakh banks were unable to roll over their external debts and service sizeable
maturing liabilities. Condence in the Kazakh banking sector declined and consequently, in
2008 there was a marked fall in household deposits as a share of GDP (see Table 2).
[Insert Table 2]
Accordingly, domestic liquidity conditions tightened signicantly in 2007. To support the
liquidity of banks, the NBK reduced reserve requirements and arranged large scale liquidity
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provisions through foreign exchange swaps, repo agreements and early redemption of NBK
notes. Furthermore, the NBK intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market to prop up
the tenge. The main vehicle for crisis relief in the Kazakh banking sector and real economy
was a newly formed state entity, Samruk-Kazyna (SK). At the end of 2007 the assets on SKs
consolidated balance sheet totalled $47 billion (equivalent to 45% of GDP), which were largely
from the Oil Fund (IMF, 2009b).2
Following the sharp depreciation of the Russian ruble, the tenge was devalued by almost
a fth in February 2009 to improve the competitiveness of Kazakh exports, save on foreign
currency reserves and decrease the pressure on the domestic currency. After the devaluation
of the tenge, the debt-servicing burdens of Kazakh banks, which were already struggling to
renance foreign funding, increased further. In 2009  10 two large domestically owned banks
(the BTA and Alliance banks) and two smaller domestically owned banks (Temir Bank and
Astana Finance) stopped making principal payments and were forced to restructure their ex-
ternal obligations (IMF, 2010). Consequently, international rating agencies downgraded the
debt ratings of systemically important Kazakh banks. In addition, by 2009 the ratio of non-
performing loans to total lending across the sector had increased to 38% compared to 7% in
2007. The sharp increase in non-performing loans and hence the rise in loan loss provisions
resulted in almost zero industry prot in 2008. Large losses were expected in future years
because in 2008 the gap between banksassets and liabilities was equivalent to 6% of GDP.
In response to the crisis in the Kazakh banking sector, the state holding company, SK,
provided direct equity support to the three largest ailing banks so they could recapitalize. In
February 2009, SK acquired a majority stake in BTA (75%), the countrys largest bank. It
also acquired minority stakes in the second and third largest banks, Halyk Bank (21%) and
Kazkommertsbank (20%), respectively. In total SK provided $2:2 billion of support to the
three largest banks. A further $220 million was set aside to purchase more equity in Halyk
Bank and $200 million was earmarked for a stake in Alliance, the fourth largest bank. SK used
another $4 billion to support struggling real estate and construction projects, and to nance
SME lending and development of the agricultural and industrial sectors. Furthermore, SK
made deposits in the Kazakh banking system which amounted to 1:6% of GDP.
In 2009 BTA and Alliance had massive negative equity which amounted to 12:6% of GDP
and was the reason total banking capital was negative ( 915 million KZT). Although BTA
and Alliance were nationalized they defaulted on their foreign liabilities because the Kazakh
government only agreed to guarantee domestic liabilities. Despite this the dire forecasts of
bank runs never materialized. In the second half of 2009 the Kazakh banking sector started to
recover and the recovery gathered momentum in 2010. This is because: (i) oil and commodity
prices rebounded; (ii) real output growth remained positive because of looser monetary policy;
(iii) the debts of BTA and Alliance which they either defaulted on or restructured did not
unduly a¤ect the domestic deposit base (IMF, 2010); (iv) limits were placed on banksforeign
exchange borrowing.
2The Oil Fund was set up in 2001 to manage Kazakhstans liquid surplus oil revenue to avoid a situation
resembling the Dutch Disease (IMF, 2001).
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The recovery represented a period of relative stability in the Kazakh banking system which
fostered a steady improvement in liquidity and gradual rebuilding of the capital base. Nev-
ertheless, the volume of non-performing loans as a share of total lending remains high by
international standards which must be addressed to continue the rehabilitation of the Kazakh
nancial system.
3 Empirical Methodology
The relationship between the quality and risk of the loan portfolio and economic and technical
performance in the Kazakh banking industry is investigated using the parametric stochas-
tic frontier framework. Technical e¢ ciency is analyzed by tting an input distance function,
whereas economic e¢ ciency is analyzed by estimating cost, revenue and prot (standard and al-
ternative) functions. The modeling assumes that a banks observed deviation from the frontier
is caused by random noise (v) and also possibly ine¢ ciency (u). The former is a symmet-
ric normally distributed idiosyncratic error term which captures sampling, measurement and
specication error. Ine¢ ciency, on the other hand, is a one-sided non-negative error term.
We model the industry best practice frontiers by accounting for, rstly, inter-bank het-
eroscedasticity in u à la Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Battese and Coelli (1995) and sec-
ondly, unobservable heterogeneity in bankstechnologies by following the true SFAframe-
work (Greene, 2005). In particular, we model the latent heterogeneity in bankstechnologies
using bank xed e¤ects. The observable heterogeneity in bankstechnologies is modeled by
allowing bank-specic characteristics to inuence the frontier. This specication is based on a
single-step estimation procedure. It is therefore free from the bias associated with two-stage
SFA techniques (Wang and Schmidt, 2002).
In this section for sake of brevity we only discuss the cost function and its properties.
See Appendix A. 1 for the corresponding discussion pertaining to the input distance, revenue,
standard prot and alternative prot functions.3 The tted cost functions (i.e. a function for
the minimum cost required to produce outputs given the input prices), c(y; w), for N banks
over T periods are of the following form:
ln (Cit=wKit) =  + i + TL (yit; wit=wKit) + 
0
zit + vit + uit i = 1; :::; N t = 1; :::; T; (1)
where Cit is the observed cost of bank i at time t; yit is a vector of output levels; wit is a vector
of input prices; zit is a vector characterizing the quality and risk of bank is loan portfolio at
time t as well as other bank specic features. The i parameters are bank xed e¤ects which
3Berger and Mester (1997) favor the alternative prot function over the standard specication if: (i) there
are substantial unmeasured di¤erences in the quality of services provided by banks because the alternative
prot function holds the quantities of outputs constant and captures di¤erences in quality by allowing output
prices to vary; (ii) a bank cannot achieve every output scale and product mix because the quantities of its
outputs exhibit very little variability; (iii) the banking industry is imperfectly competitive; (iv) there is likely
to be measurement error in the data on output prices.
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capture the latent heterogeneity of banks which is not explained by the z variables. The TL
function in equation (1) represents the technology as the translog approximation of the log of
the cost function and is in terms of the output quantities and the normalized inputs prices.4
vit is a symmetric normally distributed idiosyncratic error term and uit is a measure of how
far away bank is costs are at time t from the best-practice level associated with the same
output quantities being produced under the same conditions. It is assumed that uit follows
a truncated normal distribution with a mean it specic to each observation. This is a more
exible assumption than assuming that uit follows a half-normal distribution (see Stevenson,
1980, for further details). The heteroscedastic frontier model assumes that it is a function of
factors specic to bank i (z). The determinants of the stochastic frontier and uit are therefore
simultaneously estimated. Specically, the mean of the ine¢ ciency distribution in equation (1)
is specied as follows:
it = 0 + 
0
z + "it: (2)
The microeconomic properties of an estimated cost function, c(y; w), are: (i) non-decreasing
in outputs, y, @ ln c (y; w) =@ ln ym  eym  0; m = 1; :::;M ; (ii) non-decreasing in input prices,
w, @ ln c (y; w) =@ lnwk  ewk  0; k = 1; :::; K; (iii) homogeneity of degree one in input prices,
w, c (y; w=wK) = c (y; w) =wK ; (iv) a concave and continuous function in inputs prices, w.
4 Data
We use rich monthly data obtained from the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the
Regulation and Supervision of the Financial Market and Financial Organizations for the period
March 2007  December 2010.5 Using this data we analyze monthly changes in the performance
of Kazakh banks during the nancial crisis. The data includes nancial, ownership and pru-
dential information for 37 second-tier commercial banks. The panel is unbalanced and consists
of 1; 566 observations covering virtually the entire Kazakh banking industry (99:7%). Only a
few small new banks were omitted due to zero values in their deposit and/or loan accounts.
We follow the Sealey and Lindley (1977) intermediation approach. Accordingly, the in-
termediate deposits of commercial banks are split into various categories of earning assets.
The inputs in the banking production process are xed capital (Fixed assets, x1), deposits
(Clients0 deposits, x2) and labor (Personnel expenses, x3). The outputs in the production
process reect both the lending and non-lending activities of banks. In particular, the out-
puts are: total customer loans (Customer loans, y1), investment securities and other securities
(Investments, y2), o¤-balance sheet items which is included as an output to capture banks
non-traditional activities (OBS, y3).6 The data is expressed in real terms at March 2007 prices
4The translog functional form is used in the model specication as it is more exible than linear functions
and captures cost (prot) behaviour of banks better. We thank the anonymous referee for the note.
5In May 2011, the NBK took over the responsibilities of the Agency through the newly formed Committee
for the Control and Supervision of the Financial Market and Financial Organizations.
6OBS includes total contingent claims which contain letters of credit, guarantees, deposits and loans placed
8
using the monthly CPI index which was obtained from the Agency of Statistics of the Republic
of Kazakhstan.
In the cost and prot function specications we use three input prices: the cost of physical
capital (Price of fixed assets, w1) which is calculated as the ratio of depreciation charges to
the value of xed assets; the cost of borrowed funds (Price of clients0 deposits, w2) which is
taken to be the ratio of interest expenses on clientsdeposits to the volume of clientsdeposits;
the cost of labour (Price of labor, w3) which is expressed as the ratio of personnel expenses
to total assets. The output prices used in the revenue and prot functions are: the price of
loans (Price of customer loans, p1) which is calculated by dividing interest income from loans
by total customer loans; the price of other earning assets (Price of investments, p2) which
is expressed as the ratio of interest income on investments and securities to the volume of
investments and securities; the price of OBS items (Price of OBS, p3) which is calculated by
dividing income generated from OBS activity by the volume of OBS items.
We capture the quality and riskiness of a banks lending using two categorizations of its
loan portfolio. Both categorizations split a banks loan portfolio into standard, doubtful and
bad loans. The rst categorization is based on the volume of loans whereas the second uses
provisions for loan losses. In both cases there are a further ve sub-categories of doubtful
loans. Doubtful loans are categorized according to the score for the loan contract, where the
least risky doubtful contracts are placed in Category 1 and the most risky are in Category 5.78
Using the rst categorization, the quality and riskiness of a banks loan portfolio is captured
using the ratio of the volume of loans in each category to total lending. Similarly, using the
second categorization quality and riskiness is modeled using the ratio of loan loss provisions
for each category to total loan loss provisions. It is important to note that there is potential
endogeneity issue related to input prices, risk variables and prot. The level of input/output
prices and banking risk are not completely exogenous because they are to some extent chosen
by the bank as part of the banks management policy. Hence, the possible endogeneity of these
variables can bias the coe¢ cient estimates. Therefore, as noted by Berger and Mester (1997),
the presented analyses is suggestive but not conclusive.
Along with the risk variables, Z-score of the analyzed banks is included in the analysis
to take into account the volatility of earnings. It is calculated as a ratio of the sum of the
return on assets (ROAit) and the capital ratio (CARit) divided by the standard deviation of
the return on assets over the analyzed period between March 2007 to Dec. 2010 (SDROAi):
i.e. Z  scoreit = (ROAit+CARit)=SDROAi. In Table 3, we present the descriptive statistics
for the inputs, outputs, prices, loan quality variables and the Z-score.
[Insert Table 3]
in the future, possible claims on bills, and the purchase and sale of nancial derivatives.
7The score for a loan is calculated according to, among other things: the nancial condition and rating of the
borrower; the quality of the collateral; any extensions to the repayment period; any write-o¤s of the borrower
by other creditors; any overdue payments.
8Details of the ve categories of doubtful loans are as follows: Category 1  substandard loans with current
payments; Category 2   substandard loans with payments in arrears; Category 3   unsatisfactory loans with
current payments; Category 4   unsatisfactory loans with payments in arrears; Category 5  doubtful loans.
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We also include a number of other z variables to capture the e¤ect of: (i) bank regulation
and supervision i.e. dummies which take a value of 1 if a bank complies with prudential capital
requirements (Prudential_Req) and limits on foreign currency positions (ForCur Limits);
(ii) state ownership vis-à-vis private ownership i.e. a State dummy which takes a value of 1 if
a bank is state owned; (iii) bank size as a proxy for international nancial intermediation and
scale of performance i.e. Small, Medium and Large bank size dummies;9 (iv) negative equity
i.e. a Negative Equity dummy which takes a value of 1 if a bank has had negative equity at
any point over the sample period.
5 Results and Analysis
This section consists of four sub-sections. In 5:1 we present the tted models and discuss the
returns to scale estimates. In 5:2 we present and analyze the estimates of economic e¢ ciency
(cost, revenue, standard prot and alternative prot e¢ ciencies) and technical e¢ ciency (input-
oriented e¢ ciency) over the sample period using each categorization of the quality and risk of
the loan portfolio. Furthermore, in 5:3 and 5:4 we discuss the ndings on the impact of each
categorization of the quality and risk of the loan portfolio on the industry best practice frontiers
and the ine¢ ciency estimates. To put the e¤ect of each categorization on the best practice
frontiers and the ine¢ ciencies into context we also discuss the e¤ect of other z variables.
5.1 Returns to Scale
The estimation results for the two model specications for each function- model 1 (quality
and risk of the loan portfolio modeled using the volume of loans categorization) and model 2
(quality and risk of the loan portfolio modeled using the loan loss provisions categorization)
are presented in Appendix A.2. We can see from these results that the input, output and cor-
responding price elasticities for all the tted functions apart from the standard prot function
have the expected signs where signicant, implying that the monotonicity conditions are not
disproved at the sample mean. The returns to scale estimates at the sample mean from the
cost function (2:17 and 1:76 for models 1 and 2, respectively), input distance function (3:31
and 3:01 for models 1 and 2, respectively), revenue function (2:15 and 2:04 for models 1 and
2, respectively) and alternative prot function (2:78 and 3:17 for models 1 and 2, respectively)
are in some cases considerably greater than unity i.e. an average Kazakh bank operates at
increasing returns to scale in all eight cases.10 The above scale elasticities are computed at the
9The bank size dummies are based on a size categorization of banks according to total assets. In particular,
banks are classied as: small - if their total assets are less than 10; 000; 000 (000s) KZT; medium - if their total
assets are between 10; 000; 000 (000s) KZT and 1; 000; 000; 000 (000s) KZT; large - if their total assets exceed
1; 000; 000; 000 (000s) KZT.
10Cost (Alternative prot) returns to scale (RTS) can be dened as the percentage change in cost (alternative
prot) as a result of a one percent increase in all outputs. In other words, cost (alternative prot) RTS are
equal to the reciprocal of the sum of the cost (alternative prot) elasticities with respect to the outputs i.e.
(
P
ey)
 1. It follows therefore from a tted input distance function that RTSIDF =  (
P
ey)
 1. Revenue
RTS can be dened as the percentage change in revenue when there is a one percent increase in all inputs i.e.
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sample mean of the data and are therefore unweighted average measures. A countrys banking
industry, however, is generally characterized by a large number of small banks where the scale
elasticity is high and a small number of large banks where the scale elasticity is low, possibly
below one. Therefore, the above unweighted scale elasticities are most probably overestimates
due to a large number of small banks in the sample as we use data for virtually the entire
Kazakh banking industry. Asset weighted average scale elasticities would be lower than the
corresponding unweighted elasticities.
Interestingly, revenue returns to scale from models 1 and 2 are very similar. In contrast,
there is a marked change in cost, alternative prot and input distance economies of scale
depending on whether the measure of loan portfolio quality and risk is the volume of loans cat-
egorization or the loan loss provisions categorization. The robustness or sensitivity of economies
of scale to the measure of loan portfolio quality and risk is most probably because the economic
frontiers are sensitive to the a¤ect of managerial discretion on loan loss provisions which is a
tool to manipulate bank prot. At the sample mean, investments and OBS items are not the
source of the di¤erence between cost returns to scale for models 1 and 2 and between the esti-
mates of alternative prot returns to scale because the parameter estimates for these outputs
are all small. Our results suggest that the large di¤erence between the cost returns to scale and
the alternative prot returns to scale from models 1 and 2 is due to nancial intermediation
activities. More specically, we attribute the di¤erences in cost returns to scale and alternative
prot returns to scale to di¤erences in the marginal e¤ects of customer loan issuance in models
1 and 2.
5.2 E¢ ciency Results
Average economic and technical e¢ ciency scores for Kazakh banks over the sample period are
reported in Table 4. In general, the average e¢ ciency scores over the sample period using
the volume of loans categorization range from 69%   88%, the exception being the average
e¢ ciency score from the revenue function (47%). More specically, the average e¢ ciency score
from the cost model over the sample period suggests that the costs of an average bank are 12%
above the best practice level. Similarly, mean prot e¢ ciency scores over the sample period
of 79% and 80% suggest that, on average, banks make about 80% of the prot which the best
practice bank would make under the same conditions.
[Insert Table 4]
The Kruskal-Wallis tests of the null that the e¢ ciency scores from corresponding models
(e.g. the two cost models) in Table 4 do not di¤er is always rejected. That said, the di¤erence
between the corresponding average standard prot and alternative prot e¢ ciencies is negligi-
ble. Over the sample period there is a 14% di¤erence between the average e¢ ciency scores from
the cost functions and there is a 6% di¤erence between the average e¢ ciency scores from the
RTSRF =  (
P
ex)
 1.
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revenue functions. The corresponding average input-oriented and average revenue e¢ ciency
scores are characterized by a somewhat downward trend which is more evident in prot e¢ -
ciency scores. A downward trend in average economic e¢ ciency and average technical e¢ ciency
is to be expected over the nancial crisis.
Average cost e¢ ciencies are presented in Figure 1. The plot suggests that although there
is a considerable di¤erence between the average cost e¢ ciencies from models 1 and 2, there is
little di¤erence between the average cost e¢ ciencies at the start of the sample period compared
to the end of the period. It is evident from Figure 2 that this is also the case for the average
input-oriented and the average revenue e¢ ciencies. It is apparent, however, that the average
e¢ ciencies from the standard and alternative prot functions at the start of the sample period
are well above the levels which we observe at the end of the sample period. Summarizing,
this suggests that the nancial crisis only had a sustained detrimental e¤ect on the average
e¢ ciencies from the standard and the alternative prot functions.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2]
We can see that average technical e¢ ciency from model 1 is well above that from model
2 for the entire sample period. Conversely, average revenue e¢ ciency from model 2 is much
higher than that from model 1 throughout the sample period. The average prot (standard
and alternative) e¢ ciencies from models 1 and 2, however, are very similar over the whole
sample period. It is also evident that the average prot (standard and alternative) e¢ ciencies
are much more volatile than the other average e¢ ciencies. That said, we observe at least
one spike in the other average e¢ ciencies. Over the course of the nancial crisis there are
large isolated temporary changes in the average e¢ ciencies from the cost, revenue and input
distance functions. For example, the average cost e¢ ciency from model 1 fell to 66% in August
2008. Average cost e¢ ciency from model 1 once again fell to 64% in October 2009 but on
this occasion is was the result of a steady decline over several months. In October 2009, the
average cost e¢ ciency from model 2 had fallen to 79%. It is not surprising that the lowest
average cost e¢ ciencies are observed in 2009 because it was a very turbulent year for the
Kazakh banking industry. As was noted in Section 2, in 2009 the level of non-performing loans
increased dramatically and in July 2009 the equity capital of the banking system was negative.
The BTA and Alliance cost e¢ ciencies from models 1 and 2 are presented in Figures 3
and 4. The cost e¢ ciencies add credence to the anecdotal evidence on the troubles of BTA
and Alliance during the nancial crisis. Apart from the sharp fall in the BTA cost e¢ ciency
scores in September 2008, BTA was performing well relative to the industry average up until
April 2009, which was when BTA defaulted on its foreign liabilities. From April 2009, the cost
e¢ ciency of BTA from both models deteriorates rapidly over a period of several months. By
July 2009, BTAs ratio of bad loans to total lending (54%) was the highest in the industry.
According to the cost models, in June 2010 BTA was the worst performing bank in the industry
with an e¢ ciency score of 6% from model 1 and 31% from model 2.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4]
12
The Alliance cost e¢ ciencies over the sample period follow similar paths to those for BTA.
It should be noted, however, that although the Alliance and BTA cost e¢ ciencies started to
decline in April 2009, the decline was much more sustained for BTA. This is evident because
the Alliance cost e¢ ciencies started to rise in November 2009, whereas the BTA cost e¢ ciencies
did not begin to rise until July 2010. This corroborates the view that BTA su¤ered more during
the nancial crisis than Alliance.
5.3 Impact of Loan Portfolio Quality and Risk on the Frontiers
The estimates of the e¤ect of each z variable on the industry best practice frontiers and
the bank ine¢ ciencies are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Specically, the estimates in Table
5 are for model 1 (i.e. when loan portfolio quality and risk is measured using the volume of
loans categorization) and the estimates in Table 6 are for model 2 (i.e. when loan portfolio
quality and risk is measured using the loan loss provisions categorization). A cursory glance
at the results indicates that the Medium bank size dummy has been omitted to avoid perfect
collinearity. This means that the e¤ects of Small and Large banks are relative to the e¤ect of
the Medium size category. Other z variables which are omitted for the same reason are: the
ratio of the volume of doubtful loans in the fth category to the total volume of doubtful loans;
the ratio of loan loss provisions in the fth category to total loan loss provisions; the ratio of
the volume of standard loans to the volume of total lending; the ratio of loan loss provisions
for standard loans to total loan loss provisions.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6]
Turning our attention to the e¤ects of the z variables on the industry best practice frontiers
(see the top panels of Tables 5 and 6). It is evident that the ratio of the volume of bad loans
to the volume of standard loans has a small e¤ect on each of the frontiers, which is similar in
magnitude in corresponding models e.g. both the cost functions. It is surprising that all the
BL=SL parameters are so small but this is because the e¤ect of the quality and risk of the loan
portfolio is being captured by other variables. The large and signicant e¤ects of other variables
which measure the quality and risk of the loan portfolio often vary between corresponding
models. For example, it is apparent that relative to DL Category 5=DL, DL Category 3=DL
has a large negative e¤ect on the revenue frontier and relative to RDL Category 5=RDL, RDL
Category 3=RDL has a small positive e¤ect on the revenue frontier. Also, we can see that
DL=TA has quite a large negative e¤ect on the alternative prot frontier, whereas RDL=TA
has quite a large positive e¤ect on the alternative prot frontier.
Interestingly, the tted models suggest that if there is an increase in BL=TA, there will be
a big improvement in the cost and input distance best practice frontiers. Also, we nd that
an increase in RBL=TA will have a large positive e¤ect on the alternative prot best practice
frontier. All these ndings are consistent with skimpingbehavior which is where banks allocate
less resources to loan screening because they have short run objectives of cost minimization
and revenue maximization. This can serve to improve cost and revenue performance in the
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short term but in the medium to long term it will have a detrimental e¤ect on cost and
revenue performance. Skimpinghas also been used to explain the ndings of other studies of
bank performance in both advanced and emerging economies (e.g. Berger and DeYoung, 1997;
Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Delis et al., 2011; Berger et al. 2009). In the other models where
BL=TA or RBL=TA are signicant the parameters have the expected signs. This suggests that
an increase in BL=TA or RBL=TA will have an undesirable e¤ect on industry best practice.
Whereas the e¤ect of the BL=SL variable on the best practice frontiers is similar in mag-
nitude in the corresponding models in Tables 5 and 6, this if often not the case for other
z variables. Negative Equity, for example, has quite a large positive and signicant e¤ect on
the cost frontier in model 1 but it does not have a signicant e¤ect on the cost frontier in model
2. That said, the signicant coe¢ cients on Negative Equity consistently suggest that it has
a detrimental e¤ect on industry best practice. Furthermore, the signicant Small and Large
bank size parameters suggest that industry best practice will improve if, relative to the number
of medium-sized banks, there are more small and large banks. The Z   score parameter is
signicant in all functions for both models. In particular, in the input-distance and revenue
function for both models it has expected positive impact. That is banks with higher Z score,
i.e. more stable banks with fewer risk, tend to perform better in terms technical and revenue
activities. The negative sign of Z   score in the cost function is also expected as it suggests
that more stable banks have lower costs. However, when it comes to prot functions, the
negative sign is at odds with the expectations but in line with the ndings relating to negative
equity in the next sub-section. It suggests that less stable banks with higher risks tend to have
signicantly higher prots.
5.4 Impact of Loan Portfolio Quality and Risk on Ine¢ ciency
Moving onto consider the e¤ects of the z variables on economic ine¢ ciency and technical
ine¢ ciency (see the bottom panels of Tables 5 and 6). It is evident that, in general, where the
DL=TA and RDL=TA parameters are signicant, the e¤ect on ine¢ ciency is negative. The
exception is the positive e¤ect which RDL=TA has on cost ine¢ ciency.
Where the BL=TA parameter is signicant, the e¤ect on ine¢ ciency is positive. Sun and
Chang (2011) also nd a positive relationship between credit risk and ine¢ ciency for banks
in emerging Asian countries. Specically, we nd that BL=TA has the biggest positive e¤ect
on alternative prot ine¢ ciency and smaller positive e¤ects on cost ine¢ ciency and revenue
ine¢ ciency. This is most probably because, as Berger et al. (2009) note, prot e¢ ciency is a
more encompassing measure of economic performance and incorporates both cost and revenue
e¢ ciency. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in both model specications foreign
ownership has a signicant negative e¤ect on technical ine¢ ciency and a signicant positive
e¤ect on cost ine¢ ciency. There is no consensus in the banking performance literature on
whether foreign owned banks are more e¢ cient than their domestic counterparts. For example,
Jemric and Vujcic (2002) nd that foreign owned banks in Croatia are far more e¢ cient than
domestic banks. Similarly, Weill (2003) nds that foreign owned banks in Poland and the
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Czech Republic are more e¢ cient than domestic banks, which he attributes to foreign banks
having more human capital and better corporate governance. Conversely, other studies such
as Hasan and Marton (2003) nd that foreign banks in transition economies are less e¢ cient
than domestic banks. Lensink et al. (2008) analyze the performance of over 2000 banks in
105 countries and conclude that foreign banks are less e¢ cient than domestic banks. They
attribute the di¤erence between the e¢ ciency of domestic and foreign banks to banking system
conditions and the economic climate in the relevant countries.
Since the most distressed banks in Kazakhstan were domestic banks, our nding that foreign
owned banks were less cost e¢ cient during the nancial crisis could well be because they did not
engage in skimping. If banks skimp they are likely to allocate fewer resources to underwriting
and monitoring loans, thereby saving costs in the short term. Having said this, the quality
of the loan portfolio declines because of skimpingand the subsequent rise in non-performing
loans is likely to increase a banks costs in the medium to long term. Our results are consistent
with foreign banks allocating more resources than domestic banks to screening loans, appraising
collateral and monitoring borrowers, rather than skimpingon these costs. This would explain
why over the sample period foreign banks have a lower ratio of non-performing loans to total
lending.
Both of the tted input distance functions suggest that, relative to medium-sized banks,
small banks are more technically ine¢ cient. The second specication of the revenue function
also suggests that small banks are relatively ine¢ cient. In contrast, the second specication
of the standard prot function and the alternative prot function suggest that large banks
are more ine¢ cient than their medium-sized counterparts. Comparing and contrasting all the
above ndings on the e¤ect of bank size on ine¢ ciency, with the estimates of the e¤ect of bank
size on the frontier suggests that an improvement in industry best practice (i.e. the availability
of better technology) does not necessarily lead to more e¢ cient bank performance.
The Negative Equity parameter is signicant in the rst specication of the input distance
function. TheNegative Equity parameters are also signicant in the second specication of the
cost function and revenue function. As expected all the signicantNegative Equity parameters
are positive, which suggests that Negative Equity leads to more ine¢ cient performance. This
nding could well be a feature of banking performance during the nancial crisis because in an
earlier study by Hasan andMarton (2003) a positive relationship between the level of equity and
ine¢ ciency is observed. Interestingly, our results suggest that Negative Equity does not a¤ect
standard prot ine¢ ciency, whereas we noted in 5:3 that Negative Equity has a detrimental
e¤ect on the standard prot frontier in both of the tted models and on the alternative prot
frontier in the second specication. This suggests that the large negative equity of a small
number of banks during the nancial crisis a¤ected prot best practice at the industry-wide
level but not the prot ine¢ ciency of individual banks.
Turning our attention to the e¤ect on bank performance of compliance with prudential
capital requirements and limits on foreign currency positions. In general, our ndings suggest
that compliance with prudential capital requirements or limits on foreign currency positions
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has no implications for banking performance. There are, however, four interesting exceptions-
the positive and signicant ForCurr Limits parameter in the cost function (Model 1), and
the signicant positive coe¢ cient on ForCurr Limits in the second specication of the input
distance function and negative coe¢ cients in the revenue and standard prot function in Model
2.
The positive and signicant ForCurr Limits parameter in the tted model 1 specication
of the cost function suggests that more risk averse banks which comply with the limits on
foreign currency positions are more cost ine¢ cient. Being more cost e¢ cient in the short
term by not complying with the regulations is consistent with banks being less risk averse and
skimping, which will ultimately erode the quality of the loan portfolio. Hellmann et al. (2000)
develop a theoretical model which shows that nancial liberalization gives rise to such problems.
The intuition behind their model is as follows. Financial liberalization promotes entry to the
banking industry which intensies competition and erodes bank prot. The capitalized value of
expected prots (i.e. the franchise value) falls and there is less incentive to issue good loans to
preserve the franchise value. In their model banks choose between investing in a prudent asset
which yields a high expected return or investing in a gambling asset which yields a very high
return if the gamble pays-o¤ but if it doesnt depositors bear the cost of the investment. The
conclusion which is reached from the model is that following nancial liberalization there will
be a bigger incentive to invest in gambling assets. This model and, in particular, the scenario
where gambles do not pay-o¤ is akin to developments in the Kazakh banking sector during the
nancial crisis.
Upon receiving favorable credit ratings from major international credit agencies, many
Kazakh banks engaged in a range of new foreign exchange activities. The second specication
of the input distance function suggests that banks are more technically ine¢ cient if they are
less risk averse and exceed limits on foreign currency positions. Along similar lines, the second
specication of the revenue and standard prot functions suggests that banks which exceed
limits on foreign currency positions are more ine¢ cient. This is most probably because more
risk averse banks which comply with limits on foreign currency positions are less exposed to
risky foreign currency operations.
6 Lessons from the Kazakh Experience
Using rich monthly data for virtually the entire Kazakh banking industry over the nancial cri-
sis, SFA is applied to the nancial intermediation approach to t a number of functions. Among
other things, from the tted functions we estimate the e¤ects of two measures of the quality
and riskiness of the loan portfolio on the industry best practice frontiers and the technical and
economic ine¢ ciencies of individual banks. The determinants of the bank technologies and
bank ine¢ ciencies shed light on Kazakh bank behavior over the nancial crisis. For example,
we nd that an increase in the volume of bad loans as a ratio of total lending has a desirable
e¤ect on the cost, input-distance and alternative prot frontiers, all of which is consistent with
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the skimpinghypothesis. In the loan loss provisions specications, an increase in the ratio of
reserves on bad loans to total reserves has the expected signicant detrimental e¤ect on the
cost, input distance and revenue frontiers, which is at odds with the skimpinghypothesis.
Given there is a lot of anecdotal evidence of skimpingby Kazakh banks during the nancial
crisis and non-performing loans is still a big concern in the Kazakh banking industry, the ratio
of the volume of bad loans to total lending, rather than the ratio of reserves on bad loans to
total reserves, should be used by the regulatory authorities to monitor non-performing loans.
To conclude, an empirical analysis of Kazakh banking e¢ ciency using non-parametric frontier
models with bootstrapping would be a worthwhile and interesting area for further work.
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Figure 1: Average cost e¤ciency (CE) of Kazakh banks
19
Figure 2: Average economic and technical e¢ ciencies of Kazakh banks
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Figure 3: Cost e¢ ciency (CE) of BTA bank
Figure 4: Cost e¢ ciency (CE) of Alliance bank
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Table 1: Structure of the Kazakh banking industry (1995 - 2010)
1995 1997 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of commercial banks 130 81 48 34 35 37 37 39
of which have a foreign stakeholder in authorized capital 8 22 16 14 18 13    
Number of branches of commercial banks 1; 036 582 417 418 352 379 374 365
Notes: - indicates that the data is not available.
Sources: European Bank of Reconstruction and Development; National Bank of Kazakhstan; Financial
Supervision Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Table 2: Kazakh banking sector indicators
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total assets (% of GDP) 60:6 87:5 87:8 74:1 68 61:9
Foreign stake (% of total industry assets) 7:3 5:9 15:8 15:8 23:4 34
Loans (% of GDP) 41:1 59:1 66:6 57:6 60:3 46:5
Household deposits (% of GDP) 33:9 46:5 48:2 28:6 37:6 35:2
Return on Assets (%) 1:8 1:4 2:6 0:32  1:4  1:2
Return on Equity (%) 14:1 14:7 22:87 2:6  12:6  10:6
Industry concentration (%)** 58:8 57:9 59:6 58:3 54:6 53:6
Non-performing loans (% of total loans) 3:3 2:4 2:7 7:1 37:8 33:7
Notes: * Excludes Alyans Bank, Temir Bank and BTA bank.
** Concentration is dened as the ratio of assets of the three largest banks to total bank
sector assets.
Sources: National Bank of Kazakhstan and Financial Supervision Agency of the
Republic of Kazakhstan.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for inputs, outputs, prices and loan quality variables
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Outputs Quality of loans (%)
Customer loans (y1) 158064026 337414737 DL=TA (z1) 0:254 0:233
Investments (y2) 30018124 83761696 DL Category 1=DL (z2) 0:458 0:332
OBS (y3) 226292194 540920253 DL Category 2=DL (z3) 0:164 0:228
Inputs DL Category 3=DL (z4) 0:097 0:158
Fixed assets (x1) 4628750 8698509 DL Category 4=DL (z5) 0:091 0:163
Clients0 deposits (x2) 155545119 309677357 DL Category 5=DL (z6) 0:121 0:196
Personnel expenses (x3) 182666 281382 BL=TA (z7) 0:061 0:12
BL=SL (z8) 0:319 3:231
RDL=TA (z1) 0:491 0:31
Output prices RDL Category 1=RDL (z2) 0:247 0:285
Price of customer loans (p1) 0:024 0:093 RDL Category 2=RDL (z3) 0:139 0:218
Price of investments (p2) 0:07 0:462 RDL Category 3=RDL (z4) 0:133 0:187
Price of OBS (p3) 0:087 0:694 RDL Category 4=RDL (z5) 0:134 0:192
Input prices RDL Category 5=RDL (z6) 0:275 0:276
Price of fixed assets (w1) 0:017 0:029 Reserves on bad loans=TA (z7) 0:457 0:311
Price of clients0 deposits (w2) 0:024 0:392
Price of labor (w3) 0:121 0:205 Z   score 35:025 38:806
Notes: DL - doubtful loans; TA - total assets; BL - bad loans; SL - standard loans; RDL - reserves on
doubtful loans.
All values are at January 2007 Kazakh tenge prices (000s).
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Table 4: Economic and technical e¢ ciency scores
CF IDF RF SPF APF
Model 1 (volume of loans categorization)
2007 0:711 0:843 0:475 0:841 0:816
2008 0:741 0:834 0:453 0:812 0:791
2009 0:710 0:814 0:449 0:786 0:781
2010 0:691 0:793 0:408 0:763 0:756
Total sample 0:713 0:819 0:444 0:798 0:784
Model 2 (loan loss provisions categorization)
2007 0:854 0:758 0:526 0:849 0:784
2008 0:875 0:749 0:517 0:825 0:826
2009 0:845 0:743 0:498 0:803 0:802
2010 0:832 0:720 0:477 0:787 0:776
Total sample 0:851 0:742 0:503 0:814 0:794
Model 1 vs. Model 2
Kruskal-Wallis test 47:34 22:83 23:08 4:79 12:57
Notes: CF - cost function; IDF - input distance function; RF -
revenue function; SPF - standard prot functions; APF - alternative
prot function.
The Kruskal-Wallis test statistic is Chi-square distributed with 1
degree of freedom.
* denotes signicance at the 5% level and ** denotes signicance
at the 1% level.
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Table 5: Impact on the frontiers and ine¢ ciency (model 1)
Variable CF IDF RF SPF APF
E¤ect on the industry best practice frontier
DL=TA 0.356*** 0.138* -0.665*** -0.162* -0.575***
DL Category 1=DL -0.264** 0.007 -1.483*** -0.258*** -0.192**
DL Category 2=DL 0.139* -0.01 -1.431*** -0.174** -0.029
DL Category 3=DL 0.06 -0.015 -1.263*** -0.062 0.283*
DL Category 4=DL 0.043 -0.104* -1.667*** -0.001 -0.005
BL=TA -1.343*** 1.100*** -0.273 0.141 0.342
BL=SL 0.004 0.007** -0.016** -0.001 -0.002
Foreign -2.048*** 2.606*** -5.946*** -1.685*** 0.131
State -1.862*** 1.986*** -1.332*** -2.186*** -0.311
Small -0.901*** 0.940*** 3.494 0.099 0.169
Large -0.097 -0.003 0.015 0.327*** 0.299*
Negative Equity -1.057 0.155 0.511 -0.517*** -0.244*
Z   score -0.565*** 0.526*** 0.372*** -0.006*** -0.005***
E¤ect on banking ine¢ ciency
DL=TA -0.822*** 0.166 -1.601*** -3.581 -15.584**
DL Category1=DL 0.344** 0.058 -1.872*** -7.689 -5.732**
DL Category2=DL -0.407*** 0.13 -1.861*** -4.664 -2.047
DL Category3=DL 0.062 0.051 -1.843*** -3.874 1.348
DL Category4=DL -0.287* 0.026 -2.276*** -1.109 -0.457
BL=TA 1.426*** 2.977*** 1.241* 4.723 6.588*
Foreign 1.235 0.632*** 0.475 -2.421 -3.119
State 0.049 -1.068*** 0.362* -0.308 0.762
Small 0.410** -5.625 2.002*** -34.517 -31.464
Large 0.443*** 2.353*** 4.419 0.037 -0.127
Negative Equity 0.280** -0.174 -0.272 3.09 5.903**
Prudential_Req -0.063 0.03 -0.127 -0.231 0.375
ForCur Limits 0.189** 0.031 -0.275 -1.476 0.659
Notes: * denotes signicance at the 5% level; ** denotes signicance at
the 1% level; *** denotes signicance at the 0.1% level.
DL - doubtful loans; TA - total assets; BL - bad loans; SL - standard loans.
Monthly unbalanced data consists of 46 time periods (from March 2007 to
Dec 2010) of 37 banks (1566 observations).
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Table 6: Impact on the frontiers and ine¢ ciency (model 2)
Variable CF IDF RF SPF APF
E¤ect on the industry best practice frontier
RDL=TA -0.027 -0.051 -2.788*** -0.326** 0.316*
RDL Category 1=RDL 0.052 -0.001 -0.069 -0.100* -0.142*
RDL Category 2=RDL 0.091* 0.018 0.197* -0.117* -0.11
RDL Category 3=RDL -0.06 0.159*** 0.411*** 0.069 0.091
RDL Category 4=RDL -0.005 -0.086* 0.072 0.096 0.059
RBL=TA -0.064 0.036 -2.871*** -0.334** 0.405**
Negative Equity -0.142 -0.182*** 1.024 -0.409*** -0.116
BL=SL 0.001 0.005** -0.015* -0.003 -0.007*
Foreign -0.416*** 0.821*** -0.823*** -1.567*** 0.323
State -0.979*** 1.318*** -2.147*** -0.538*
Small -0.710*** 1.256*** 3.275 0.135 0.215*
Large -0.02 -0.012 -0.142 0.251** 0.253*
Z   score -0.535*** 0.455*** 0.320*** -0.004*** -0.003*
E¤ect on banking ine¢ ciency
RDL=TA 8.112* 0.197 -4.176*** -1.970* -4.608*
RDL Category 1=RDL 0.022 -0.057 0.077 -4.854** -11.851*
RDL Category 2=RDL -1.195* 0.036 0.237 -6.128* -7.908
RDL Category 3=RDL 0.514* 0.305*** 0.323 -2.204* -3.061
RDL Category 4=RDL -0.504 -0.064 0.042 -0.095 -0.487
RBL=TA 8.258* 0.666*** -4.079*** -0.414 0.477
Negative Equity 1.272*** -0.009 2.214*** -0.694 1.025
Foreign 0.503** -0.567*** 0.2 -0.799 -0.156
State 1.199*** -6.014 2.051*** -27.7 -36.452
Small 0.851*** 1.340*** 4.734 0.828 0.993
Large -0.065 -6.195 -0.646** 1.202* 1.798
Prudential Req -0.1 0.023 -0.182 0.189 2.155
ForCur Limits -0.062 0.214** -0.418* -1.946* -2.089
Notes: * denotes signicance at the 5% level; ** denotes signicance at the 1%
level; *** denotes signicance at the 0.1% level.
RDL - reserves on doubtful loans; TA - total assets; RBL - reserves on bad
loans; BL - bad loans; SL - standard loans.
Monthly unbalanced data consists of 46 time periods (from March 2007 to
Dec 2010) of 37 banks (1566 observations).
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A Appendices
A.1 Four Further Functions and their Properties
In addition to cost e¢ ciency which was discussed in Section 3, four other e¢ ciency measures
are estimated in this paper. The four other e¢ ciency measures are estimated by tting an input
distance function (IDF), revenue function (RF) and two specications of the prot function,
standard (SPF) and alternative (APF). These functions have the following forms:
  lnxKit =  + i + TL (yit; xit=xKit) + 0zit + vit   uit (IDF)
  ln (Rit=pKit) =  + i + TL (xit; pit=pKit) + 0zit + vit   uit (RF)
  ln (it + =wKit) =  + i + TL (pit; wit=wKit) + 0zit + vit   uit (SPF)
  ln (it + =wKit) =  + i + TL (yit; wit=wKit) + 0zit + vit   uit; (APF)
where x is a matrix of inputs in the banking technology; y is a matrix of outputs; w is a matrix
of input prices; p is a matrix of output prices; R is a vector of banksrevenues;  is a vector of
banksprots;  is a constant added to every banks prot so that the natural log is a positive
number.
As was the case for the cost function the error components are v and u. Unlike for the cost
function, however, the ine¢ ciency term u is subtracted for the other functions. This is because
cost ine¢ ciency measures the distance to the minimum attainable cost whereas standard prot,
alternative prot and revenue ine¢ ciency measure the distance to the maximum achievable
level. Technical e¢ ciency from a tted input distance function measures how close a banks
usage of resources is to the minimum attainable level of inputs. Given the input distance
function is an input requirement function multiplied by  1, ine¢ ciency is subtracted rather
than added.
Information on the quantities of inputs and outputs is needed to represent the production
technology using the input distance function, DI (y; x). DI (y; x) is dened according to the
input set and satises the following properties:
(i) non-decreasing in inputs x, @ lnDI=@ lnxk  exk  0; k = 1; :::; K;
(ii) non-increasing in outputs y, @ lnDI=@ ln ym  eym  0; m = 1; :::;M ;
(iii) homogeneity of degree one in inputs x, DI (y; x=xK) = DI (y; x) =xK ;
(iv) concave and continuous function in inputs x.
Estimating the revenue function, r(x; p), is based on the assumption that producers attempt
to maximize their revenue. Information on inputs and output prices is required to estimate the
revenue function. The revenue function satises the following properties:
(i) non-decreasing in output prices p, @ ln r (x; p) =@ ln pm  epm  0; m = 1; :::;M ;
(ii) non-decreasing in inputs x, @ ln r (x; p) =@ lnxk  exk  0; k = 1; :::; K;
(iii) homogeneity of degree one in output prices p, r (y; p=pM) = r (y; p) =pM
(iv) convex and continuous function in output prices p.
To t the standard prot function, (p; w), information on input and output prices is
required. The standard prot function has the following properties:
(i) non-decreasing in output prices p, @ ln  (w; p) =@ ln pm  epm  0; m = 1; :::;M ;
(ii) non-increasing in input prices w, @ ln  (w; p) =@ lnwk  ewk  0; k = 1; :::; K;
(iii) homogeneity of degree one in output prices p and input prices w,  (w; p=pM) =
 (w; p) =pM and  (w=wK ; p) =  (w; p) =wK ;
(iv) convex and continuous function in output prices p and input prices w.
26
The right-hand side of the alternative prot function is the same as the right-hand side
of the cost function. The standard and alternative prot functions have the same dependent
variable. The alternative prot function, (y; w), therefore holds output levels constant, as
is the case in the cost function, and allows output prices to vary and inuence prot. The
properties of the alternative prot function are:
(i) non-decreasing in outputs y, @ ln  (y; w) =@ ln ym  eym  0; m = 1; :::;M ;
(ii) non-increasing in input prices w, @ ln  (y; w) =@ lnwk  ewk  0; k = 1; :::; K;
(iii) homogeneity of degree one in input prices w,  (y; w=wK) =  (y; w) =wK ;
(iv) convex and continuous function in input prices w.
All the functions tted here contain the translog approximation of the relevant function.
The general form of the translog approximation of each function for panel data at time t is as
follows:
TL (a; b) = 0la+ 0lb+
1
2
Ala0la+
1
2
Blb0lb+ la lb+ 1t+
1
2
2t
2 +  0lat+ 0lbt;
where la = ln(a); lb = ln(b); 1 and 2 are parameters to be estimated; 
0, 0,  0 and 0 are
vectors of parameters to be estimated; A, B and   are matrices of parameters to be estimated.
The signs of the elements of 0 and 0 indicate whether the monotonicity conditions of TL(a; b)
are satised.
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A.2 The Fitted Functions
Estimation results for model 1 (volume of loans categorization)
CF IDF RF SPF APF
TC=w1 LHS  lx1 LHS TR=p1 LHS =w1 LHS =w1 LHS
y1 0.385*** y1 -0.274*** x1 0.033 p1 -0.112*** y1 0.344***
y2 0.032*** y2 -0.013** x2 0.346*** p2 -0.006 y2 0.002
y3 0.044*** y3 -0.015* x3 0.087** p3 0.024*** y3 0.014
w2=w1 0.198*** x2=x1 0.487*** p2=p1 0.058*** w2=w1 0.092*** w2=w1 -0.051**
w3=w1 0.602*** x3=x1 0.138*** p3=p1 0.307*** w3=w1 0.502*** w3=w1 0.603***
(y1)
2 0.048*** (y1)
2 -0.034*** (x1)
2 -0.060*** (p1)
2 0.003 ly11 0.077***
(y2)
2 0.004*** (y2)
2 -0.002* (x2)
2 -0.008 (p2)
2 0.005 ly22 0.001
(y3)
2 -0.001 (y3)
2 -0.002* (x3)
2 -0.02 (p3)
2 0.010*** ly33 0.008***
y1y2 -0.002 y1y2 0.003 x1x2 0.117*** p1p2 -0.049*** ly12 -0.014**
y1y3 0.003 y1y3 -0.004 x1x3 -0.007 p1p3 0.034*** ly13 -0.024***
y2y3 -0.004*** y2y3 0.002* x2x3 0.017 p2p3 -0.007** ly23 0.006**
(w2=w1)
2 0.004*** (x2=x1)
2 0.055*** (p2=p1)
2 0.000 (w2=w1)
2 0.021*** (w2=w1)
2 0.037***
(w3=w1)
2 0.055*** (x3=x1)
2 0.006 (p3=p1)
2 0.028*** (w3=w1)
2 0.084*** (w3=w1)
2 0.147***
(w2=w1) (x2=x1) (p2=p1) (w2=w1) (w2=w1)
(w3=w1) -0.043*** (x3=x1) -0.014* (p3=p1) 0.025*** (w3=w1) -0.058*** (w3=w1) -0.113***
y1(w2=w1) 0.034*** y1(x2=x1) 0.002 x1(p2=p1) 0.016 p1(w2=w1) 0.033*** y1(w2=w1) -0.020**
y1(w3=w1) -0.070*** y1(x3=x1) 0.01 x1(p3=p1) -0.026* p1(w3=w1) -0.058*** y1(w3=w1) -0.001
y2(w2=w1) -0.004*** y2(x2=x1) 0.003* x2(p2=p1) 0.011 p2(w2=w1) -0.015*** y2(w2=w1) 0.002
y2(w3=w1) 0.023*** y2(x3=x1) 0 x2(p3=p1) 0.042*** p2(w3=w1) 0.037*** y2(w3=w1) 0.006
y3(w2=w1) 0.009*** y3(x2=x1) 0.004 x3(p2=p1) -0.020* p3(w2=w1) 0.003 y3(w2=w1) -0.021***
y3(w3=w1) -0.017*** y3(x3=x1) -0.014** x3(p3=p1) 0.013 p3(w3=w1) -0.061*** y3(w3=w1) 0.032**
t 0.009*** t -0.009*** t 0.006*** t -0.001 t 0.000
t2 -0.000*** t2 0.000 t2 0.000*** t2 0.000 t2 0.000
y1t 0.002*** y1t 0.001** x1t -0.003** p1t -0.003** y1t -0.002
y2t 0.000 y2t -0.000** x2t -0.002* p2t -0.001* y2t 0.000
y3t -0.001*** y3t 0.000 x3t 0.002 p3t 0.001 y3t 0.003***
(w2=w1)t -0.003*** (x2=x1)t -0.002*** (p2=p1)t 0.002*** (w2=w1)t -0.003*** (w2=w1)t -0.006***
(w3=w1)t 0.000 (x3=x1)t -0.001* (p3=p1)t 0.003*** (w3=w1)t 0.000 (w3=w1)t 0.004***
Log-
Like-
lihood 288.79 466.92 -967.21 -327.06 -666.74
Notes: CF - cost function; IDF - input distance function; RF - revenue function; SPF - standard prot function; APF - alternative
prot function. All regressions include individual xed e¤ects for banks (not reported in the table).
* denotes signicance at the 5% level; ** denotes signicance at the 1% level; *** denotes signicance at the 0.1% level.
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Estimation results for model 2 (loan loss provisions categorization)
CF IDF RF SPF APF
TC=w1 LHS  lx1 LHS TR=p1 LHS =w1 LHS =w1 LHS
y1 0.502*** y1 -0.288*** x1 -0.027 p1 -0.146*** y1 0.289***
y2 0.028*** y2 -0.023*** x2 0.387*** p2 0.000 y2 0.012
y3 0.037*** y3 -0.021*** x3 0.129*** p3 0.025*** y3 0.014
w2=w1 0.225*** x2=x1 0.465*** p2=p1 0.034*** w2=w1 0.115*** w2=w1 -0.064***
w3=w1 0.566*** x3=x1 0.127*** p3=p1 0.292*** w3=w1 0.490*** w3=w1 0.614***
(y1)
2 0.068*** (y1)
2 -0.054*** (x1)
2 -0.074*** (p1)
2 -0.013* ly11 0.075***
(y2)
2 0.003*** (y2)
2 -0.004*** (x2)
2 -0.018* (p2)
2 0.007** ly22 0.001
(y3)
2 -0.001 (y3)
2 -0.002* (x3)
2 -0.022 (p3)
2 0.008*** ly33 0.007***
y1y2 0.001 y1y2 0.007** x1x2 0.168*** p1p2 -0.053*** ly12 -0.008
y1y3 -0.010** y1y3 0.000 x1x3 -0.02 p1p3 0.038*** ly13 -0.024***
y2y3 -0.001 y2y3 0.000 x2x3 0.018 p2p3 -0.004 ly23 0.006**
(w2=w1)
2 0.007*** (x2=x1)
2 0.041*** (p2=p1)
2 0.002 (w2=w1)
2 0.021*** (w2=w1)
2 0.041***
(w3=w1)
2 0.062*** (x3=x1)
2 0.014*** (p3=p1)
2 0.031*** (w3=w1)
2 0.087*** (w3=w1)
2 0.172***
(w2=w1) (x2=x1) (p2=p1) (w2=w1) (w2=w1)
(w3=w1) -0.037*** (x3=x1) -0.024*** (p3=p1) 0.016*** (w3=w1) -0.060*** (w3=w1) -0.138***
y1(w2=w1) 0.056*** y1(x2=x1) -0.026** x1(p2=p1) 0.020* p1(w2=w1) 0.035*** y1(w2=w1) -0.039***
y1(w3=w1) -0.047*** y1(x3=x1) 0.014 x1(p3=p1) -0.004 p1(w3=w1) -0.058*** y1(w3=w1) 0.029
y2(w2=w1) -0.004*** y2(x2=x1) 0.008*** x2(p2=p1) 0.011 p2(w2=w1) -0.021*** y2(w2=w1) 0.003
y2(w3=w1) 0.021*** y2(x3=x1) 0.007** x2(p3=p1) 0.047*** p2(w3=w1) 0.038*** y2(w3=w1) 0.011*
y3(w2=w1) 0.009** y3(x2=x1) 0.010* x3(p2=p1) -0.020* p3(w2=w1) 0.003 y3(w2=w1) -0.021***
y3(w3=w1) -0.030*** y3(x3=x1) -0.004 x3(p3=p1) -0.018 p3(w3=w1) -0.059*** y3(w3=w1) 0.024*
t 0.009*** t -0.006*** t 0.003* t 0.000 t 0.000
t2 -0.000*** t2 0.000 t2 0.000*** t2 0.000 t2 0.000
y1t 0.003*** y1t 0.000 x1t 0.000 p1t -0.003** y1t -0.001
y2t 0.000 y2t 0.000 x2t -0.003*** p2t -0.001** y2t 0.000
y3t -0.001* y3t 0.000 x3t 0.001 p3t 0.001 y3t 0.003***
(w2=w1)t -0.003*** (x2=x1)t -0.003*** (p2=p1)t 0.001* (w2=w1)t -0.003*** (w2=w1)t -0.005***
(w3=w1)t 0.001* (x3=x1)t -0.001* (p3=p1)t 0.002** (w3=w1)t 0.000 (w3=w1)t 0.003**
Log-
Like-
lihood 333.22 520.47 -778.63 -267.06 -614.56
Notes: CF - cost function; IDF - input distance function; RF - revenue function; SPF - standard prot function; APF - alternative
prot function. All regressions include individual xed e¤ects for banks (not reported in the table).
* denotes signicance at the 5% level; ** denotes signicance at the 1% level; *** denotes signicance at the 0.1% level.
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